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I have eaten and drunk, walked and slept with the imbecile, and here and in Europe I have personally examined over five thousand cases. I know what society has to fear from the imbecile. I also know his needs and his rights and the protection he demands at our hands ; and I therefore make my appeal in behalf of those whom the French have so touchingly named *Les Enfants du bon Dieu*.

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SIDGWICK AND SCHOPENHAUER ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY.

PROFESSOR HENRY SIDGWICK in his "Methods of Ethics" lays down three abstract moral principles, which he regards as self-evident. The first of these principles is that "if a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not right (or wrong) for some one else, it must be on the ground of some difference between the two cases, other than the fact that he and I are different persons."

Let us take an easy instance of the application of this principle and see how it defends our moral judgments against the perverting influence of passion and self-interest. We have an excellent case in point in the interview between Nathan and David described in the second book of Samuel. David severely condemned the conduct of the imaginary rich man who seized the poor man's only ewe lamb, but, perverted by passion and egoism, he had failed to condemn the heinousness of his own similar conduct. He had thought himself justified in doing an act of a kind that he could not approve when done by another, and the result was an infraction of the moral law. In Kantian language he had acted on a maxim that he could not will to be law universal. Nathan helped him to arrive at a correct judgment in his own case by inducing him to give judgment on an imaginary third person,

in the estimation of whose conduct he would not be misled by the irrational preference for his own ego and by the tendency that we all have to regard ourselves in certain cases as more important than other human beings. David, having condemned the action of the rich man in Nathan's story, showed his recognition of the truth of the principle enunciated by Sidgwick, when he condemned his own injustice to Uriah and exclaimed "I have sinned against the Lord." The principle exemplified above is found on examination to be the only self-evident element in the idea of Justice.

Professor Sidgwick's next great fundamental principle of morality is not concerned with the conflict between the ego and the non-ego, but with the comparative value of different periods in the existence of the ego. It prescribes "impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life," and warns us that "Hereafter (as such) is to be regarded neither less nor more than Now." A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, and we may of course rationally prefer the certainty of happiness in the immediate future to the mere possibility of the same amount of happiness in the distant future. But we often go a step farther than this. We often sacrifice the future to the present, not from a well-considered recognition of the uncertainty of the future, but because we are impulsively carried away by the prospect of immediate pleasure, and are, from deficiency of imagination, unable to realize the prospects of future happiness. This is the irrationality condemned by Sidgwick's maxim of Self-love or Prudence.

Professor Sidgwick's third great principle is the principle of Rational Benevolence. It prescribes that "one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as one's own, except in so far as we judge it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable." In support of this principle he makes an appeal to Butler's "plain man," who (so he thinks) "if his conscience were fairly brought to consider the hypothetical question, whether it would be morally right for him to seek his own happiness on any occasion, if it involved a certain sacrifice of the greater happiness of some other human being—without

any counterbalancing gain to any one else—would answer unhesitatingly in the negative." So he probably would. But the full import of the Rational Principle upon which Benevolence is founded, would seem to be wider than this. It is propounded elsewhere as the "self-evident principle that the good of any one individual is of no more importance from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other." This cuts both ways. It makes it not only irrational to sacrifice the greater happiness of another to the less happiness of ourselves, but also equally irrational to sacrifice the greater happiness of ourselves to the less happiness of another. If the plain man of Butler were informed that the principle of Benevolence forbids the latter kind of sacrifice, he would be much astonished. Indeed it is rather a startling paradox to oppose Benevolence to self-sacrifice. Many plain men and a still larger number of plain women are so addicted to extreme acts of self-sacrifice that they think it praiseworthy, benevolent, and presumably rational to sacrifice everything for the good of others, like St. Paul, who was willing to have his name blotted out of the book of salvation for the sake of his brethren. Therefore the appeal to common sense in support of the last of Sidgwick's Principles should rather be to the common sense not of the "plain man," but of those rare persons who are able to take the point of view of the universe and looking down, as from heaven, on the earth can recognize that the good of all men is equally desirable in the sight of God or as an element in the well-being of the universe, and that, from a strictly rational point of view, a man should regard his own good as neither less nor more important than that of any other man.

We may then sum up the result of Professor Sidgwick's three principles by saying that they prescribe on the one hand disregard of difference of persons in our moral judgments and in promoting the good of men generally, and, on the other, disregard of mere difference of time in providing for our own good.

It is strange to find that Schopenhauer, by an entirely different route and following the guidance of Indian philosophers,

comes to almost exactly the same conclusion, when he investigates the metaphysical basis of morality. The great German pessimist makes pity the foundation of his moral system. The two all-embracing virtues of justice and charity are, according to him, based upon pity. He does not think that an action has any moral virtue except in so far as it springs from this motive. When pity prevents us from harming others, we manifest the virtue of justice; when the same feeling prompts us actively to aid and relieve the sufferings of others, we manifest the virtue of charity. From these two virtues all morality can be deduced, and thus Schopenhauer establishes pity as the foundation of morality.

In the last and most interesting chapter of his moral treatise he undertakes the task of finding a metaphysical justification of his moral theory, and finds it in the essential unity which, according to his philosophy and the philosophy of India, underlies the variety of phenomena. The bad man makes a great difference between himself and others. So he does not hesitate to injure others for his own advantage, and refuses to help them when they are in distress. The good man, on the contrary, more or less identifies himself with others. So great is his sympathy with them that their sorrows are his sorrows and their joys are his joys. In fact, the good man intuitively recognizes the great philosophical truth that, in spite of the misleading influence of appearances, the whole universe, including men and women, is really one and not many. This essential unity of the universe is expressed in the Hindu aphorism "*Tat twam asi* (Thou art that)," which recognizes the unity of all in Brahma. Schopenhauer also quotes from the Baghavad-Gita "He who sees the same highest lord existing in all living creatures and not perishing when they perish, he sees clearly. He who sees everywhere the same lord present, does not injure himself by his own fault, and thence goes to the highest path." The Sanskrit term *maya* is used to express the delusion that the material world with all its phenomenal differences is a real existence. When we escape from this delusion, we may expect to see clearly in moral and other questions. Thus, as regards the

principles of Justice and Benevolence, Sidgwick, Schopenhauer and perhaps Indian philosophy, may be regarded as substantially in agreement. Sidgwick tells us that the principles of Justice and Benevolence require us in our moral judgments to make no difference between other men and ourselves. Schopenhauer finds at the bottom of morality the fact that there really is no difference between other men and ourselves, and he finds a recognition of the same great truth in Indian philosophy.

But what are we to say about Sidgwick's principle of Prudence? Here we seem to find distinct opposition between the two moralists under consideration, as Schopenhauer places our self-regarding actions entirely beyond the pale of moral philosophy. The difference between the two thinkers will however be found upon examination to be more verbal than real. In his investigation of the metaphysical foundation of morality Schopenhauer deduces the falsity of the wicked man's idea of the wide difference between man and man from the Kantian doctrine of the ideality or non-reality of space and time. When the wicked man says "*Pereat mundus dum salvus sim,*" he is justified from an empirical point of view in making a difference between himself and others. In the empirical domain man is distinct from man, but the difference does not belong to the real essence of the universe. It is entirely due to space and time, which he therefore calls the *principium individuationis*. When we accept the doctrine of the ideality of space and time expounded by Kant in his "Transcendental Ästhetic," we see the real identity of man and man and act like moral beings. Thus Schopenhauer's virtues of Justice and Charity are ultimately deducible from Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space and time. If, however, we start from one part of Kant's doctrine, namely, the ideality of time, we must in the same way deduce from it Sidgwick's principle of Prudence, which, as we have seen, prescribes the ignoring of all difference of time in estimating our own present and future good. So that the doctrine of Kant, from which Schopenhauer deduces the virtues that he recognizes, Justice and Charity, must also lead to the rationality of

Sidgwick's principle of Prudence, and, though Schopenhauer would refuse to call that principle a moral principle, he would at any rate be logically bound to admit that it is rational, and as rational as the moral principles which rest upon the same metaphysical basis.

In conclusion, it remains to consider an objection which at first sight appears to make Schopenhauer's ethical system defeat its own end. Again and again he insists upon the fact that the great end of moral philosophy, and one which none but his system can well effect, is the overthrow of egoism. But we have seen that, while Sidgwick and the utilitarian school agree with the Gospel precept, and teach us to love our neighbor as ourselves, Schopenhauer, in accordance with the doctrines of Indian philosophy, declares that our neighbor *is* ourselves. If this be true, men who think they are doing good to others are in reality doing good to themselves, and thus, when they have mastered the great doctrine of identity, their pity and their benevolence are merely forms of a new and more extensive form of egoism. Thus we seem to be plunged at once into the cheerless darkness of Hobbism.

The answer to this objection is to distinguish between the two kinds of egoism, namely, on the one hand, the egoism of most men who, looking at the world from the empirical point of view, regard themselves as different from other men, and, on the other hand, the all-embracing egoism of the philosopher who identifies himself with his fellow-men. It is only to the former kind of egoism that the moral philosophy based upon pity is diametrically opposed. To the latter kind of egoism it is not opposed, nor need it be. Egoism is not in any way immoral, when it does not lead to cruelty and injustice. The most tenderly compassionate man who regards his neighbor's suffering as his own and acts accordingly, may be, strictly speaking, an egoist, as he seeks the good of his wider self; but his egoism is blameless and entirely free from all taint of immorality. Such a man is not precluded from attaining to the highest virtue. He is capable of self-sacrifice, for the self-sacrifice praised by moralists is the sacrifice of one's empirical self; and the fact that such self-sacrifice is

made in a moment of mental exaltation, when the agent pierces through the veil of illusion that generally conceals the identity of man and man, does not detract from the high moral value of such action.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT: ON THE LINES OF MODERN EVOLUTION. By John Beattie Crozier, author of "Civilization and Progress," etc. Vol. I.: Greek and Greco-Roman Thought; Hinduism and Buddhism; Judaism; and Christianity down to the closing of the Schools of Athens by Justinian.

This volume is the first of a series in which Mr. Crozier proposes to set forth "the detailed evolution of one great factor in Civilization,—viz., Intellectual Development," under which term he includes "the great departments of Religion, Science, and Philosophy." This first volume deals with Greek and Hindoo thought, Judaism, and Christianity. These vast regions of fact are to be surveyed, and their progress "reduced to definite laws." The author does not tell us, once for all, what he understands by this phrase, which is one of those that may mislead the reader because it slips by so easily; but we may perhaps paraphrase its meaning thus: we trace the evolution of a principle when we are able to show how, the more clearly its earlier forms are *understood*, the more reason there is for anticipating that its subsequent forms would have been what they actually were. This may be granted if we remember what really is involved in "understanding" any stage of a principle in order to explain later stages by it. We must penetrate to the inner meaning of the earlier principle, and trace out its innumerable relations of dependence. We must view any concrete activity of the human spirit not only in relation to the general spiritual and material condition of humanity at the time,—the state of "civilization," as Mr. Crozier would say; if we are to understand the activity in question, we must extend this "environment" until it includes *all time and all existence*; we must see its relations to the entire universe. Our right to speak